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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, two issues have risen to the top of the international 
development agenda: (a) Food Security; and (b) Migration and Devel-
opment. Each has its own international agency champions (the FAO 
and the IOM), its own international gatherings (the Global Forum on 
International Migration and the World Forum on Food Security), its 
own national line ministries (Departments of Immigration and Home 
Affairs and Departments of Agriculture and Food Security) and its own 
voluminous body of research and scholarly publications. Some interna-
tional organizations (such as the World Bank) deal with both issues but 
in such separate silos that they might as well be in separate organizations. 
There is, in other words, a massive institutional and substantive discon-
nect between these two development agendas. The reasons are hard to 
understand since the connections between migration and food security 
seem obvious. Indeed, one cannot be properly understood and addressed 
independently of the other. 
Global and regional discussions about the relationship between migration 
and development cover a broad range of policy issues including remit-
tance flows, the brain drain, the role of diasporas and return migration.1 
Strikingly absent from these discussions is any systematic discussion of 
the relationship between population migration and food security. There 
are a number of possible reasons for this. First, discussions of the impact 
of migration on development tend to be pitched at the global and national 
scale and focus on economic growth and productive investment. Secondly, 
when discussion turns to the household level, the debate focuses largely on 
remittance flows and the use of remittances by the household. There is a 
general consensus that the expenditure of remittances on basic livelihood 
needs is somehow non-developmental in that it does not lead to invest-
ment and sustainable productive activity.2 Not only is this an extremely 
narrow perspective, it also means that the food needs of households (and 
their food security more generally) are rarely given much consideration 
as development objectives and outcomes. Thirdly, while this debate does 
seek to understand the drivers of migration, it seems to ignore food short-
ages and insecurity as a basic cause of migration and it certainly seems to 
forget that migrants themselves have to eat in the towns and cities to which 
they migrate. Finally, discussions of migration and development tend to 
focus more on international than internal migration. Food security is 
certainly affected by international migration (for example, households in 
Zimbabwe rely heavily on remittances from around the world to purchase 
food and other necessities). However, the relationship between migration 
and food security is particularly important within national boundaries. 
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If the global migration and development debate sidelines food security, 
the current international food security agenda has a similar disregard for 
migration. The primary focus of the agenda is food insecurity and under-
nutrition and how enhanced agricultural production by small farmers can 
resolve these endemic problems.3 The influential Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA), for example, was established “to achieve 
a food secure and prosperous Africa through the promotion of rapid, 
sustainable agricultural growth based on smallholder farmers.”4 In much 
of the thinking about rural food insecurity, there is an implicit assump-
tion that Africa’s rural areas are bounded territories whose main problem 
is that households do not produce enough food for themselves. 
By drawing boundaries around the “rural” in this way, there is a tendency 
to ignore the reality that migration is a critical food security strategy for 
rural households up and down the African continent. Any intervention 
to try and improve the food security of rural populations therefore needs 
to acknowledge that migration both deprives rural households of agricul-
tural labour and provides them with the remittances to purchase agricul-
tural inputs and foodstuffs. Rural households purchase a good deal of their 
food with cash that they receive from absent household members who 
are working in other parts of a country or in other countries altogether. 
Rural food insecurity is therefore not simply about how much a house-
hold produces from the land; often it is more about the fact that remit-
tances from migrants are too small or too irregular to allow households to 
purchase sufficient, good quality food. 
If migration is a neglected aspect of discussions about rural food inse-
curity, it is almost totally absent from considerations of the causes and 
impact of food security amongst urban populations. Many poor urban 
households in African cities are made up entirely or partially of migrants. 
Rural to urban migration is rarely a one-way, one-time move, however. 
Many urban dwellers speak of and feel attached to a rural home. House-
holds in Africa are often spatially stretched between rural and urban 
spaces and occupied by different members of the kin group at different 
times. The reality on the ground, then, is that the distinction between 
“the rural” and “the urban” is an “obsolete dichotomy” in Africa.5 As 
Ellis and Harris maintain: “It is not very helpful to treat ‘rural areas’ as 
undifferentiated territories that exhibit definitively distinct features from 
‘urban areas.’”6 Households are not static self-contained rural or urban 
units but fluid entities with permeable boundaries whose degree of food 
security is constantly and profoundly shaped by the mobility of people in 
a continent “on the move.”7 If we accept this general argument, it imme-
diately becomes clear that it would be unwise to drive a wedge between 
rural and urban food security as if they had very little relationship to or 
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impact on one another. On the contrary, not only are they inter-related 
but migration becomes an important key to unlocking this relationship.8
In summary, food security needs to be “mainstreamed” into the migra-
tion and development agenda and migration needs to be “mainstreamed” 
into the food security agenda.9 Without such an effort, both agendas will 
proceed in ignorance of the other to the detriment of both. The result 
will be a singular failure to understand, and manage, the crucial reciprocal 
relationship between migration and food security. This paper sets out to 
promote a conversation between the food security and migration agendas 
in the African context in the light of what we know and what we need to 
know about their connections. Four main issues are singled out for atten-
tion: (a) the relationship between internal migration and urban food secu-
rity; (b) the relationship between international migration and urban food 
security; (d) the difference in food security between migrant and non-
migrant urban households; and (d) the role of rural-urban food transfers 
in urban food security. Prior to addressing these issues, it is important to 
disaggregate the complex phenomenon of migration not least because it 
has been undergoing dramatic change in Africa.
2. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND  
 URBAN FOOD SECURITY
2.1 Urbanization and Circulation
Rapid urbanization is a distinguishing characteristic of contemporary 
Africa and a great deal of this urban growth is fuelled by rural-urban 
migration. The urban population of SADC increased from 20.5 million 
in 1990 to an estimated 34 million in 2010 (Table 1).10 UN-HABITAT 
predicts that it will increase further to 39 million in 2020 and 52 million 
in 2030. At the present time, 59% of the population is urbanized, a figure 
TABLE 1: Southern African Urban Population, 1950-2050
Population 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Urban 
(000s)
5,869 8,277 11,118 14,752 20,502 27,657 34,021 38,809 43,741 48,119 51,917
Urban (%) 37.7 42.0 43.7 44.7 48.8 53.8 58.7 63.5 68.3 72.9 75.0
All Africa 
(%)
14.4 18.6 23.6 27.9 32.1 35.9 39.9 44.6 49.9 55.7 61.6
Source: State of African Cities 2010
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projected to pass 70% in the next 20 years and to rise to over 75% by 
mid-century (Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1: Southern African Urban Population, 1950-2050
In 1990, only South Africa was more than 50% urbanized. By 2050, all 
of the region’s countries except Swaziland are projected to be over 50% 
urbanized (Table 2). Urbanization rates will exceed 75% in Angola, 
Botswana and South Africa. Evidence for rapid urbanization in Africa 
should not be interpreted as a permanent one-time rural-to-urban shift 
or that rural areas are undergoing an inevitable process of depopula-
tion. Certainly the overall trend is towards more people living for longer 
periods in towns and cities. But this does not mean that they are neces-
sarily cutting all links to the countryside. Indeed, there is considerable 
evidence that most first-generation migrants retain very close ties with 
their rural homesteads. This adds considerable complexity to our under-
standing of migration dynamics and impacts. 
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TABLE 2: Southern African Urbanisation, 1950-2050 (% Urbanised)
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Angola 7.6 10.4 15.0 24.3 37.1 49.0 58.5 66.0 71.6 76.4 80.5
Botswana 2.7 3.1 7.8 16.5 41.9 53.2 61.1 67.6 72.7 77.1 81.7
Lesotho 1.4 3.4 8.6 11.5 14.0 20.0 26.9 34.6 42.4 50.2 58.1
Mozambique 2.4 3.7 5.8 13.1 21.1 30.7 38.4 46.3 53.7 60.8 67.4
Namibia 13.4 17.9 22.3 25.1 27.7 32.4 38.0 44.4 51.5 58.6 65.3
South Africa 42.2 46.6 47.8 48.4 52.0 56.9 61.7 66.6 71.3 75.7 79.6
Swaziland 1.8 3.9 9.7 17.9 22.9 22.6 21.4 22.3 26.2 32.5 39.5
Zambia 11.5 18.2 30.4 39.8 39.4 34.8 35.7 38.9 44.7 51.6 53.4
Zimbabwe 10.6 12.6 17.4 22.4 29.0 33.8 38.3 43.9 50.7 57.7 64.4
Source: State of African Cities 2010
South Africa has the highest proportion of urban dwellers of all SADC 
countries (60-70%) and appears closest to the model of a classic “urban 
transition.”11 A progressively greater proportion of the population lives 
permanently in towns and cities, not least because the rural areas of the 
country do not offer households the prospect of a decent livelihood or 
many future prospects.12 The volume of internal migration in South Africa 
grew rapidly after the collapse of apartheid-era influx controls.13 Cumula-
tive migration (the number of people living in a province other than their 
province of birth) was 5.5 million in 2001, or more than 10% of the total 
South African-born population. Internal migration (whether of popula-
tion in general or of temporary labour migrants) is therefore an extremely 
significant phenomenon in South Africa. At the municipal level, most 
internal migration is towards municipalities that are highly urbanized (the 
so-called ‘metros’). The South African Cities Network calculated that the 
seven largest urban municipalities in South Africa attracted over 500,000 
additional migrants between 2001 and 2006.14 In five of those areas, these 
migrants made up over 4% of the total population (Table 3). 
TABLE 3: South African Municipalities Experiencing Greatest In-Migration, 2001-6
Name of Municipality Province Net In-Migration Total Pop. in 2006 Recent In-Migrants 
as % of Total Pop. 
Ekurhuleni Gauteng 140,252 2,384,020 5.9
City of Tshwane Gauteng 137,685 1,926,214 7.1
City of Cape Town Western Cape 129,400 2,952,385 4.4
City of Johannesburg Gauteng 120,330 2,993,716 4.0
West Rand Gauteng 42,674 732,759 5.8
eThekwini KwaZulu-Natal 27,277 2,978,811 0.9
Nelson Mandela Eastern Cape 6,715 1,073,114 0.6
Source: State of the Cities Report 2006, p. 2.18.
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Simply because urbanization is proceeding rapidly, it does not mean that 
individuals or households who move are cutting their links with rural 
areas. How significant a phenomenon is circular migration in South Africa 
and, if so, is it likely to continue?15 The answers to these questions have a 
significant bearing on both rural and urban food security in the country. 
Based on their work in rural and peri-urban communities in the eastern 
part of the country, Collinson et al argue for the existence of “highly 
prevalent circular migration” between rural and urban areas and note a 
marked increase in temporary female migration.16 While there does seem 
to be a trend towards greater permanent migration of households to urban 
areas, temporary labour migration from rural households did grow after 
the end of apartheid. The number of rural households with members who 
were migrant workers actually increased in the 1990s and a significant 
proportion of households are reliant on migrant remittances. In 1993, 33% 
of all rural households reported at least one migrant member. By 2002, 
this figure had increased to 38% (an increase of 300,000 households).17 In 
the last decade, however, it appears that the number of households with 
migrant workers may have begun to fall as migrants (and households) 
settle more permanently in urban areas.18 The number of households with 
an absent adult member, for example, dropped from 2.2 million in 1993 
to 1.6 million in 2008 (a fall to 30% of all households). 
Zambia represents a rather different model of the relationship between 
internal migration and urbanization. The nature of urbanization in Zambia 
has been a source of debate for years.19 Zambia’s urban population grew 
from 3.2 million in 1990 to 3.6 million in 2000. However, the proportion 
of the population living in urban areas actually fell from 39% to 35%, 
prompting researchers to conclude that growing economic hardship and 
urban poverty was leading to a process of “counter-urbanization.”20 As 
Potts concludes, “while the fact of net out-migration from urban areas 
during the 1990s has now been established as a component in the drop 
in urbanisation levels, it is possible to now state that it was the primary 
component”.21 Zambia’s post-2000 economic recovery and growth may 
well have reversed the counter-urbanization trend of the 1990s. Certainly 
this is the view of UN-HABITAT which estimates that urban growth 
rates increased from 1.1% per annum between 1995 and 2000 to 2.3% per 
annum between 2005 and 2010. Zambia’s Central Statistical Office notes 
a recent increase in rural-rural and rural-urban migration and a decline 
in urban-rural migration (Figure 2).22 However, there is every indication 
that rural-urban linkages remain strong in Zambia and will remain that 
way into the foreseeable future. 
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FIGURE 2: Internal Migration in Zambia, 1996-2006
Source: Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, Inclusive Growth in Zambia, p. 4.
Zimbabwe presents a third scenario in which political and economic crisis 
have precipitated major shifts in internal population movement. During a 
relatively prosperous first decade of independence after 1981, rural-urban 
migration increased rapidly as people sought new economic opportunities 
in the country’s towns and cities.23 Most new urbanites maintained close 
contact with their rural roots and circular migration was fairly typical.24 In 
the 1990s, the country’s Structural Economic Programme (SAP) slowed 
both the post-independence economic boom and the pace of urbaniza-
tion.25 Unemployment began to increase but the urban population still 
increased by over 1 million between 1990 and 2000 (and from 29% to 
34% of the total population). The crisis in the formal urban job market 
and the serious decline in urban incomes led to net out-migration from 
the main towns.26 
Draconian government policies caused further livelihood destruction and 
internal migration. The forcible expropriation of white-owned commer-
cial farms led to massive displacement of black farmworkers to the towns. 
That was followed by Operation Murambatsvina, “a lethal mixture of 
vindictive electoral politics, a particularly strong attachment to planned 
environments, and a wish to reduce the urban population for political 
and economic reasons.”27 The nationwide assault on urban informality 
destroyed the housing and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of urban 
households.28 However, it was not particularly successful in its aim of 
forcing urban-dwellers to retreat permanently into the rural areas. The 
major difference with Zambia in the 1990s was that many households, 
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both rural and urban, turned to international migration as a survival 
strategy.29 
Deborah Potts has recently reviewed the empirical evidence on urbaniza-
tion trends in Sub-Saharan Africa and argues that the idea that migration 
is a permanent move to urban areas is misplaced.30 Drawing on a range of 
empirical sources, and her own longitudinal tracking of migration trends 
in Zimbabwe, she argues that “circulation” between rural and urban areas 
is still a defining characteristic of African urbanization and internal migra-
tion:
 Circular migration between rural and urban areas remains a crucial, 
and adaptable, aspect of urbanization processes in sub-Saharan 
Africa… The scale, duration and direction of such migration flows 
have adapted in logical ways to the increasing poverty in urban 
areas that accompanied structural adjustment, and net in-migration 
has been reduced, sometimes very markedly. These adaptations are 
mainly the result of very negative livelihood changes for most of the 
urban population for whom there is no economic safety net, if all else 
fails, except within the nexus of rural-urban linkages.31
Various household surveys by Potts and others suggest that the dynamics 
of urbanization, circular migration and rural-urban linkage are complex 
and highly variable. As Potts notes, “migrants in town include different 
types of people with different histories, aspirations and social connections 
with their place of origin.”32 
Given the high rates of urbanisation in Southern Africa, migrants have 
a visible presence in the region’s towns and cities. AFSUN’s urban food 
security baseline survey in 2008-9 found that poor neighbourhoods in 
most cities were dominated by migrants.33 Of the 6,453 urban house-
holds interviewed in 11 SADC cities, 38% were first-generation migrant 
households (that is, every member of the household was born outside the 
city). In contrast, only 13% of households had no migrant members. The 
remainder (nearly half) comprised a mix of migrants and non-migrants, 
usually households in which the adults were migrants and the children 
were born in the city. The relative importance of migrants did vary from 
city to city, however. All of the cities had a comparatively small propor-
tion of non-migrant households (ranging from a low of 5% in the case 
of Gaborone to a high of 20% in the case of Johannesburg). In other 
words, in every city 80% or more of the households were composed 
either entirely of migrants or had some migrant members. The biggest 
difference was in the relative number of migrant households (from a high 
of 67% in Gaborone to a low of 9% in Harare). 
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At a general level these differences are attributable to each country’s distinc-
tive history of urbanisation. The four ex-apartheid cities (Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, Msunduzi and Windhoek) all have relatively high numbers 
of pure migrant households, a pattern that is broadly consistent with mass 
rural to urban household migration following the collapse of apartheid. 
Cities in countries that have been independent for a longer period (such as 
Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia) tend to have more mixed households and 
fewer purely migrant households. In those countries, independence was 
accompanied by rapid in-migration to primate cities and those urbanites 
have been in the cities long enough to have second and even third genera-
tion members born in the city. Mozambique and Zimbabwe became 
independent rather later and were also severely affected by pre-indepen-
dence civil conflict and post-independence economic crisis. These two 
cities have an extraordinarily high number of mixed households (nearly 
80%). The obvious anomaly in the survey is Gaborone with two thirds of 
its households consisting entirely of migrants. Gaborone has been urban-
izing much faster than the either Manzini or Maseru (with which it is 
often compared) (see Table 4), a reflection of the fact that Botswana’s 
economy is much more vibrant that Lesotho or Swaziland’s, drawing 
more migrant households from the countryside to the city.
TABLE 4: Proportion of Migrant and Non-Migrant Households
City Migrant Households 
(% of Total)
Mixed Households (% 
of Total)
Non-Migrant 
Households (% of 
Total)
Gaborone 67 28 5
Cape Town 54 40 6
Msunduzi 48 43 9
Windhoek 49 40 11
Johannesburg 42 35 23
Maseru 37 52 11
Manzini 32 55 13
Lusaka 24 56 20
Blantyre 17 65 18
Maputo 11 78 11
Harare 9 78 13
Total 38 49 13
2.2 Food Security and Stretched Households
The rural focus of the international and national food security agenda is 
already influencing the way in which the migration-food security nexus is 
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understood. A recent issue of the journal Food Policy, for example, suggests 
that “the sending of a migrant means the loss or reduced presence of one 
or more members of the household. On the consumption side this clearly 
means fewer mouths to feed and to support in other ways. On the produc-
tion side, migration means the loss of labor and, in fact, the negative 
consequences of migration on nutrition are likely to come through this 
labor loss.”34 The major positive impact of migration is the remittances 
sent home by the migrant which can have direct and indirect effects on 
production and consumption.35 Implicit in this analysis is a prioritisation 
of the impact of migration on the food security of the rural household. 
This is an important issue, but so is the relationship between migration 
and the food security of the urban household. A focus on migrant remit-
tances will break the conventional notion of the rural household as wholly 
or mainly dependent on smallholder production, but it does not take us 
far enough in addressing the full range of impacts that migration has on 
food security, including the food security of the permanent and tempo-
rary residents of the region’s towns and cities. 
Rapid urbanization certainly effects massive change in the volume and 
nature of what a growing city eats. However, conceptualizations of 
migration and food security need to take account of the reality of “highly 
mobile urban and rural populations, coupled with complex, fluid house-
holds.”36 The concept of the “stretched household” seems most relevant 
to breaking down the artificial wall between the urban and the rural and 
between rural and urban food security. First, it more closely approximates 
a reality in which migrants “continue to be members of rural households 
whilst forming or joining other households in an urban area.”37 Secondly, 
it emphasizes the complex connections between the urban and the rural:
 The notion of a “divide” (between the rural and the urban) has 
become a misleading metaphor, one that oversimplifies and even 
distorts realities… The linkages and interactions have become an ever 
more intensive and important component of livelihoods and produc-
tion systems in many areas – forming not so much a bridge over a 
divide as a complex web of connections in a landscape where much is 
neither “urban” nor “rural.”38
Thirdly, the concept highlights the fact that urban and rural food security 
are often inter-dependent at the level of the individual household. 
As urban-urban migration increases (for example, from smaller urban 
centres to large cities) within countries and across borders, “stretched 
households” are also emerging in the purely urban context. In Lesotho, 
for example, many households in the capital city of Maseru have members 
working in South African towns and cities. The National Migration 
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Survey in Namibia found that urban-urban migration made up 20% of 
lifetime migration moves.39 In South Africa, the “fluidity, porosity and 
spatially ‘stretched’ nature of households” has been observed. Household 
fluidity relates to the “contested nature” of household membership, the 
claims of non-core urban household members on household resources 
and the “spatially extended nature of the links and resource flows 
thus created.”40 As a result, the density of exchanges between the two 
(primarily of people, goods, cash and social grants) impacts on the food 
security of stretched households:
 These (migrant) exchanges, networks and resource flows play a key 
role in alleviating the effects of poverty and managing vulnerability. 
They help households and household members to take advantage of 
opportunities and to diffuse risk across space. Ties to urban beneficia-
ries are a vital source of income for rural households in the context of 
ever-present monetisation and when living even in the countryside 
requires cash. For urban dwellers, the possibility of entitlements from 
rural households serves as a vital livelihood ‘cushion’, particularly if 
the rural kin have access to land or are able to care for children while 
parents seek employment in urban centres.41 
Increasingly, multi-nodal households are emerging, “stretched” between 
two or more locations. In Maputo, poor urban households are stretched 
to include the Mozambican countryside and urban areas in South Africa: 
 The urban poor in Maputo survive through a variety of strategies. 
The use of kinship networks is a principal strategy, in which ‘non-
market solidarities’ are activated in the face of the failure of the state. 
The development of multiple household strategies, and the dispersal 
of family members geographically is one such strategy. A network of 
exchanges is developed between the households, with members in 
town exchanging goods and services with households in the coun-
tryside. Members of the family may migrate to neighbouring coun-
tries such as South Africa in order to spread the risk and diversify the 
sources of survival. Faced with the exigencies of survival there is a 
tension between the need for family cohesion and the pull of dispersal. 
The dissolution of traditional social bonds has been a cause of enor-
mous insecurity and social vulnerability.42
Even in a small country like Lesotho, household members are dispersed by 
migration yet maintain strong social and material links with one another:
 The Basotho are integrated together in a fluid shifting ensemble 
of people, where members of the same family may have a relative 
managing sheep and goats in the upper Senqu Valley in Lesotho, while 
his brother cultivates mountain wheat and keeps a home ready for the 
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herdsman when he comes down for the winter. They have a sister who 
has married in the lowlands, where she struggles to grow maize on an 
exhausted piece of eroded land. Her husband is fortunate to work in 
the South African mines, and comes home monthly. When he was 
younger he brought cattle back home from the mines, but now as he 
has grown older he prefers to bring money and food and household 
goods. Most of his remittances are spent on food, clothing, education 
and medical expenses. They have another brother who teaches school 
in a peri-urban community near Mafeteng and two younger sisters: 
one who works as a domestic in Durban, South Africa, and another 
who works in a textile factory in Maseru. Both support themselves 
but also send money home. The sister recently married a policeman in 
the city of Bloemfontein, South Africa, and is waiting until he finds a 
place for both of them so she can move there. An uncle in Bloemfon-
tein who took permanent residence in South Africa when he retired 
from the mines is helping them find a place to live. All of these folk 
visit each other regularly, so that there is a constant flow from moun-
tain to lowland to town to South African city and back.43
In other words, a “household” may well have migrant members living, 
working and otherwise making do in more than one city in the country 
or region. This adds yet another layer of complexity and fluidity to house-
hold food security strategies. 
3. SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION  
 AND FOOD SECURITY
3.1 Changing Migration Streams
Prior to the 1990s, most international migration in the Southern African 
region involved young, mostly male, labour migrants moving tempo-
rarily to another country to work in primary industry such as mining and 
commercial agriculture. This form of “circular migration” began in the 
late nineteenth century and became entrenched in the twentieth.44 The 
system was closely regulated by governments and employers who ensured 
that other family and household members remained behind in the country 
of origin. Most migrants were warehoused in single-sex dormitories on 
mines or farms where they were fed high-protein diets by employers.45 
Migrants remitted most of their earnings to rural households who used 
the funds to pay taxes and purchase basic necessities. Employers paid low 
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wages on the assumption that the rural household would produce food 
to feed itself. This practice became less tenable as the twentieth century 
progressed and the sub-continent’s rural areas became more degraded and 
incapable of supporting the population through agriculture. The inevi-
table result was that in many areas the food security of rural households 
became increasingly dependent on migrant remittances. 
Since 1990, Southern Africa’s longstanding regime of temporary cross-
border migration has undergone major transformation.46 The reconfigu-
ration of migration streams has considerable implications for urban and 
rural food security and the migrants who shuttle between town and coun-
tryside. In order to understand the complex inter-relationships between 
mobility and food security, it is therefore necessary to understand the 
different types of migration that make up the contemporary migration 
regime of a region ‘on the move.’ Firstly, since 1990, there has been a 
dramatic increase in legal cross-border migration to and within Southern 
Africa. Traffic between South Africa and the rest of Africa increased 
from around 1 million in 1990 to nearly 10 million in 2008 (Figure 3). 
Increased mobility has also been observed at numerous other borders 
across the SADC region. There are now some migrants from each SADC 
country in every other SADC country. 
FIGURE 3: Legal Entries to South Africa from Rest of Africa, 1990-2010
Source: Statistics South Africa 
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Zimbabwe has become the major migrant sending country in Southern 
Africa in the last two decades. The vast majority of these migrants are 
in South Africa with smaller numbers in other SADC countries and 
in Europe and North America. The number of Zimbabweans crossing 
legally into South Africa increased from under 200,000 per annum in 
the late 1980s to 1.5 million in 2010 (Figure 4). In addition, there are 
an unknown number of undocumented migrants who cross the border 
through unofficial channels. Zimbabwean migrants maintain very close 
ties with the country, remitting considerable sums of money and quanti-
ties of goods to household members still in the country. Most engage in 
circular migration and return home frequently. In a 2006 survey, SAMP 
found that 31% return to Zimbabwe at least once a month and 76% at 
least once a year.47 
FIGURE 4: Legal Entries from Zimbabwe to South Africa, 1980-2010
Source: Statistics South Africa
Circular migration is also a defining characteristic of migrants who move 
to South Africa from other countries in the SADC region. The numbers 
of migrants from all the other countries in the region have grown consis-
tently since 1994. Those from Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho come 
in the greatest numbers. As the Lesotho case demonstrates, this is not just 
a case of growing numbers but involves complex reconfigurations in who 
migrates, where and why.48 For decades, cross-border migration from 
Lesotho to South Africa was primarily undertaken by young males who 
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went to work on the South African gold mines. This decades-old pattern 
began to break down in the 1980s and 1990s when the mining industry 
closed mines and retrenched Basotho migrant workers in considerable 
numbers. In response, more women began to migrate for work within 
and outside the country. In South Africa, women tend to work in two 
sectors known for their lack of regulation and labour rights: commercial 
farms and domestic work.49 Within Lesotho, the growth of a domestic 
textile industry in the country’s urban centres has led to a major upsurge 
in the internal migration of young women (Figure 5).
FIGURE 5: Male Employment in South African Mines and Female  
Employment in Lesotho Garment Factories, 1990-2006
A household survey by SAMP in 2006 in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozam-
bique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe showed that minework in South Africa 
still constitutes a significant component of the cross-border migration 
flow (Table 5).50 The occupational profile of Zimbabwean migrants is 
far more diverse than migrants from the other countries, with very few 
mineworkers from that country:
 The contemporary migration flow from Zimbabwe is extremely 
“mixed” compared with pre-1990 out-migration and with that from 
other countries in the Southern African region. There are almost as 
many women migrants as men; there are migrants of all ages from 
young children to the old and firm; those fleeing hunger and poverty 
join those fleeing persecution and harassment; they are from all rungs 
of the occupational and socioeconomic ladder; they are highly-read 
and illiterate, professionals and paupers, doctors and ditch-diggers.51  
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TABLE 5: Occupations of Labour Migrants in South Africa, 2006
Occupation Country of Origin
Botswana 
%
Lesotho  
 %
Mozambique 
%
Swaziland 
%
Zimbabwe 
%
Total 
%
Professional
Professional 
worker
1.6 2.9 1.7 3.5 14.7 4.8
Health worker 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 10.6 2.3
Employer/ 
Manager
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.3 0.3
Teacher 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 7.0 1.5
Farmer 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.5
Businessman/
woman 
0.6 1.2 4.0 1.1 4.2 2.2
White Collar
Office Manager 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.8 3.5 0.9
Office Worker 1.1 0.3 0.4 1.7 4.6 1.5
Blue Collar
Skilled manual 0.8 6.2 8.0 6.1 4.9 5.6
Foreman 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5
Police/Military 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1
Security 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.9 0.1 0.6
Mineworker 87.2 68.4 30.5 62.3 3.0 49.5
Farmworker 0.2 2.0 2.2 0.5 1.2 1.3
Service worker 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.5 9.9 3.1
Unskilled
Domestic 
worker
1.7 9.0 0.9 1.6 1.9 3.2
Unskilled 
manual 
0.5 1.5 9.5 7.8 2.1 4.7
Informal Economy
Informal 
producer
0.2 2.8 0.8 0.4 4.8 1.8
Trader/
hawker/vendor
0.0 2.0 6.0 0.7 14.7 4.6
Other 0.8 0.0 16.9 4.3 2.9 5.3
N 633 1,076 987 1,132 857 4,685
Source: SAMP Data Base
Minework is still important for Mozambicans but they, too, have an 
increasingly diverse occupational profile. In general, however, the migrant 
stream from all countries is dominated by blue collar, unskilled and 
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informal economy migrants. These migrants come from households in 
their home countries that are heavily dependent on migrant remittances 
to meet basic needs and are likely to be more food insecure than their 
better-resourced counterparts. A central question that therefore needs to 
be addressed is whether migrant-sending households are more or less food 
secure than households that do not send migrants. Another important 
question is the food security experience of migrants themselves at their 
place of destination. Since many work in low-wage sectors and jobs, and 
the cost of living is much higher in cities, it is likely that they are also 
vulnerable to food insecurity when away from home.
The number of labour migrants working without official work permits 
and/or residency status within the countries of SADC is difficult to deter-
mine. Despite very high rates of domestic unemployment, most irregular 
migrants do seem able to find jobs or income-generating opportunities. 
A 2010 SAMP study of recent Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, 
for example, found that 21% were working in the informal economy, 
10% were working part-time and 53% full-time. Only 14% were unem-
ployed.52 In South Africa, employers in sectors such as commercial 
agriculture, construction and domestic work actually prefer non-South 
African workers (since they can subvert labour laws, avoid paying benefits 
and violate minimum wage legislation).53 The primary policy response to 
irregular migration is summary arrest and deportation.54 Since 1990, just 
over 3 million migrants have been deported from South Africa (Figure 6). 
The vast majority (97%) of deportees come from other SADC countries 
(with Mozambique and Zimbabwe making up 90% of the total), leading 
some to question the cost effectiveness of this strategy. Deportation in 
such massive numbers is not generally viewed as a form of “migration” 
yet it does involve (forced) movement and can have major impacts on the 
livelihoods and food security of deportees and their households.
FIGURE 6: Deportations from South Africa, 1990-2008
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The SADC region has experienced several waves of mass “forced migra-
tion” in recent decades. Over 3 million refugees fled Mozambique in 
the 1980s to refugee camps in Malawi, South Africa and in Zimbabwe. 
In South Africa, many refugees eventually settled and were integrated 
into local rural and urban communities. The war in Angola also led to 
mass movements of refugees to neighbours Zambia and Namibia. More 
recently, other “conflict hotspots” in Africa have produced an influx of 
asylum seekers to the countries of Southern Africa. In South Africa, a 
total of 150,000 asylum applications were received by the Department 
of Home Affairs between 1994 and 2004 (Table 6). In the same period, 
only 27,000 applicants were granted refugee status. In January 2011, 
the UNHCR estimated that refugee status had been granted to around 
53,000 applicants in the whole post-apartheid period. However, the 
refugee determination process is so backlogged that asylum decisions tend 
to be taken on the basis of the country of origin rather than the individual 
circumstances of the claimant. As a result, asylum seekers from countries 
like Somalia and DRC have found it easier to get refugee status than those 
from other African countries, such as Zimbabwe.55 
Since 2004, the number of applications for refugee status has dramatically 
increased. This is partially because irregular migrants have starting using 
the system to legitimize their status in South Africa and avoid deportation. 
In 2009, for example, there were 220,028 new applications for refugee 
status (Table 7). In that year, 45,538 applications were rejected and only 
4,531 were accepted. Of these 75% were from three countries (the DRC, 
Ethiopia and Somalia). The number of registered asylum seekers in the 
country at that time was around 420,000. Zimbabwe is now the leading 
country of refugee claimants in South Africa (149,000 or 68% of all appli-
cations in 2009) followed by Malawi (16,000 or 7%). In 2009, only 200 
Zimbabweans were granted refugee status while 15,370 applications were 
refused. 
Refugees are permitted by South African law to work and earn income.56 
The situation of asylum-seekers is much more precarious: “Asylum seekers 
are not allowed to work and thus have no means to support themselves, 
if they do need support they have to approach government structures. 
Asylum seekers have no rights to food, work, health care or education.”57 
In practice, asylum-seekers have to live and many therefore resort to the 
informal economy or irregular employment in order to make ends meet 
while they wait (sometimes interminably) for their claims to be adjudi-
cated. Clearly, though, refugees and asylum seekers do not enjoy the same 
rights, levels of well-being and possibilities of access to food security.
urban food security series no. 9  19
TABLE 6: Refugee Applications in South Africa by Country of Origin,  
1994-2004
Country Applications
Number %
Africa DRC* 24 808 15.7
Angola* 12 192 7.7
Somalia 14 998 9.5
Nigeria 12 219 7.7
Kenya 10 553 6.7
Zimbabwe* 6 857 4.3
Ethiopia 6 537 4.1
Tanzania* 4 821 3.1
Senegal 4 724 3.0
Burundi 4 570 2.9
Congo-Brazzaville 3 823 2.4
Malawi* 2 765 1.8
Rwanda 2 167 1.4
Ghana 2 114 1.3
Cameroon 2 011 1.3
Ivory Coast 1 006 0.6
Asia Pakistan 12 576 8.0
India 10 472 6.6
Bangladesh 4 173 2.6
China 2 846 1.8
Bulgaria 1 616 1.0
Others 10 098 6.4
Total 157 946 100
* = SADC Countries
Source: Department of Home Affairs
The treatment of migrants in destination countries is another impor-
tant determinant of income generating opportunities and therefore of 
individual and household food security. Until recently, anti-immigrant 
hostility and xenophobia was largely seen as a Northern plague.58 
However, it is becoming increasingly evident that this phenomenon is 
also increasingly common in migrant-receiving countries in the South.59 
South Africa is one of the most migrant-intolerant countries in the world 
and xenophobic attitudes and actions are distressingly common.60 In May 
2008, xenophobic violence swept the country’s poor urban communi-
ties, leaving over 60 people dead and over 100,000 displaced.61 Damage 
to the property and businesses of migrants ran into the millions of rands. 
The violence destroyed the livelihoods of many migrants (who were 
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corralled in makeshift refugee camps) and led to a dramatic increase in 
personal insecurity and hardship for migrant-sending households in other 
countries. While this scale of violence has not been repeated, attacks on 
foreign-owned businesses continue in many areas. The specific connec-
tions between xenophobia, disrupted livelihoods and food insecurity have 
not yet been examined. However, in general, any analysis of the relation-
ship between migration and food security needs to consider the impact 
of poor and abusive treatment of migrants by citizens, officialdom and 
employers.
TABLE 7: Refugee Applications and Decisions in South Africa, 2009 
Applications Accepted Refused
Zimbabwe 149,453 200 15,370
Malawi 15,697 0 7,749
Ethiopia 10,715 1,307 3,130
DRC 6,226 779 1,706
Bangladesh 4,923 31 3,310
India 3,632 0 1,045
Somalia 3,580 1,213 638
China 3,327 0 1,634
Congo 3,223 613 1,391
Pakistan 3,196 0 1,770
Nigeria 3,023 0 2,046
Mozambique 2,559 0 882
Tanzania 1,739 0 602
Niger 1,445 0 1,071
Uganda 1,425 20 759
Burundi 1,208 133 367
Zambia 1,000 0 266
Ghana 942 0 648
Cameroon 667 9 429
Kenya 624 0 276
Angola 335 7 132
Rwanda 275 17 68
Lesotho 258 0 54
Eritrea 219 202 71
Senegal 204 0 74
Algeria 133 0 50
Totals 220,028 4,531 45,538
Source: UNHCR
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3.2  Cross-Border Migration and Urban Food   
 Security
The simplest way to examine the relationship between cross-border 
migration and food security is to ascertain (a) how international migrants 
address their own food and nutrition needs in the destination country and 
(b) what happens to the income that they earn while away from home. 
The two questions are not unrelated for the amount of money available to 
send home is to some degree contingent on the food-related expenditures 
of the migrant in the destination country. This is not as simple as it sounds 
because the food-related draw on income in the destination country 
may extend well beyond the individual migrant’s own needs. Migrants 
rarely live alone and their income may often have to support members of 
“makeshift” households (not all of whose members can find work) as well 
as second households. One of the recurrent complaints of the partners 
of male migrants in Lesotho and Mozambique, for example, is that they 
receive less money because the migrants support second families in South 
Africa as well.62
The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has conducted 
major household surveys in several SADC countries and provides valu-
able information on food expenditures in migrant-sending households.63 
Table 8 shows the sources of income for a regional sample of 4,276 house-
holds with international migrants. Cash remittances are the most impor-
tant source of income in all countries with 74% of all migrant-sending 
households receiving remittances (with as many as 95% in Lesotho and 
83% in Zimbabwe). In-country wage employment is a source of income 
for 40% of households followed by remittances in kind (37%). Remit-
tances in-kind are particularly important in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 
At the other end of the spectrum, only 8% of households receive income 
from the sale of agricultural produce and only 5% receive social grants 
(mainly in Botswana). 
Remittances and in-country employment are easily the most important 
sources of household income (an average R400 per month for each). 
However, as noted, far more households receive income from remittances 
than in-country employment.  
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TABLE 8: Income Sources of Migrant Households, 2006 (% of Households)
Botswana Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Zimbabwe Total
Wage work 87 9 34 46 57 40
Casual work 12 6 13 2 11 8
Remittances 
– money
76 95 77 64 83 74
Remittances 
– goods
53 20 65 17 68 37
Sale of farm 
products
5 2 21 9 3 8
Formal 
business
5 1 4 3 4 4
Informal  
business
9 5 23 14 17 12
Pension/
disability 
grant
19 0.5 3 2 3 5
Gifts 2 1.5 3 3 2 3
Other 1 0 3 1 0.5 1
Source: SAMP
The vast majority of households (93%) purchase food and groceries 
with their income (Table 9). No other expenditure category comes close 
although a significant minority of households pay for cooking fuel, trans-
portation, clothing, utilities, education and medical expenses. A mere 
15% spend income on agricultural inputs (mainly in Swaziland). The 
proportion of households spending remittances on food was over 80%. 
Average household expenditures on food were R288 per month which is 
much greater than the amounts spent on other common categories such 
as transportation, education and medical expenses. The average monthly 
expenditure of remittances on food was R150 per month. In other words, 
remittances provided over 50% of average household income spent on 
food. Without remittances the amount being spent on food would drop 
precipitously. Remittances are therefore a critical component of food 
security for migrant-sending households. Unsurprisingly, 82% of house-
holds said that remittances were “very important” and another 18% that 
they were “important” to meeting household food needs. 
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TABLE 9: Monthly Expenses of Migrant-Sending Households
Expenditure Item % of Households 
Spending Cash 
Income on Item
% of Households 
Spending 
Remittances on 
Item
Average Monthly 
Expense (R)
Food and groceries 93 82 288
Housing 9 10 9
Utilities 38 30 36
Clothes 42 52 267
Medical expenses 30 20 24
Transportation 44 34 48
Education 31 52 91
Entertainment 3 3 18
Savings 17 12 200
Fuel 44 6 58
Farming 15 10 434
Building 8 10 576
Special events 8 8 239
Gifts 4 3 55
Other expenses 2 1 81
Source: SAMP
The study found that 28% of households spend more than 60% of their 
income on food. This varied considerably from country to country 
ranging from 13% in the case of Zimbabwe to 40% in the case of 
Mozambique. Even with remittances, only 17% said that they had always 
or almost always had enough food in the previous year. Again this varied 
from country to country with only 2% of households in Zimbabwe saying 
they always or almost always had enough food. Mozambique returned the 
highest figure, but still only 24%. 
Cash remittances are not the only way in which migration contributes to 
household security as many migrants also send food back home as part of 
their in-kind remittance “package.” Further proof of the importance of 
migration to household food security and other basic needs is provided 
in the types of goods that migrants send home. There was little evidence 
of luxury goods being sent. Instead, clothing (received by 41% of house-
holds) and food (received by 29%) were the items most frequently brought 
or sent. In the case of Mozambique, 60% of households received food and 
in Zimbabwe, 45%. 
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4. MIGRANTS AND FOOD    
SECURITY
The next question addressed in this paper is whether migrants are more 
food insecure than longer term residents of the poorer areas of Southern 
African cities. The question is a difficult one to answer definitively for a 
number of reasons. First, there is the point already made that the food 
security of the urban and rural members of a household are inter-linked. 
One of the main reasons for temporary migration to urban areas is to earn 
income to remit to rural household members. A migrant in the city may 
sacrifice their own food security in order to remit and ensure that rural 
relatives have enough to eat. Secondly, in a region in which the majority 
of the food consumed by urban households is purchased, the food secu-
rity of the migrant is highly contingent on their ability to earn income in 
the urban formal or informal economy. Thirdly, there may be significant 
differences between internal and cross-border migrants in terms of access 
to urban employment and other income-generating activity. All of these 
issues require much further research before we can draw definitive conclu-
sions. However, there is suggestive case study evidence for some cities.
Recent studies of food security and migration in Johannesburg and Wind-
hoek provide an opportunity to compare the food security of internal and 
international migrant households.64 The Johannesburg study interviewed 
487 households, of whom 60% were internal migrants and the rest inter-
national migrants (mainly from Zimbabwe). Three quarters of the internal 
migrants were living in an informal settlement (compared to only 11% of 
cross-border migrants). Most of the cross-border migrants (86%) lived in 
the inner-city often in multi-household flats. Just over half of the house-
holds sent money outside the city. Another 21% sent food. Cross-border 
migrants in the inner-city were more likely to remit cash (60% versus 
38% of households) and food (30% versus 6%) than internal migrants 
in the informal settlement. In terms of food security, 49% said that their 
food access had improved since moving to Johannesburg while only 19% 
felt that it had deteriorated. However, cross-border migrants were more 
likely to report an improvement than internal migrants. The latter were 
also more likely to report that they had experienced food shortages in 
the previous year (68% versus 56%). Dietary diversity was also poorer 
amongst internal migrants. Clearly, migration may mean improved food 
access but it does not guarantee that shortages will not be experienced. 
Unreliable income was cited most often by both sets of migrants as the 
reason for food shortages. 
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The Windhoek study interviewed a total of 513 migrant heads of house-
hold living in formal and informal settlements. The majority (98%) were 
internal migrants, mostly from the Northern regions of the country. 
Money is remitted to rural areas by 54% of the respondents, and 90% 
of the money is sent to rural areas in the North. Neither food nor goods 
are sent in any quantity although most migrants said that the bulk of the 
money they sent was spent on food. There was no evidence of any corre-
lation between food insecurity and formal/informal residence. However, 
there was a significant association between urban food security and 
the region of origin. Migrants from the North of the country reported 
decreased food security in Windhoek compared to home, while those 
from South reported improved food security. This raises an important 
general point about the relationship between migration and urban food 
security i.e. that rural areas are far from uniform in their levels of food 
insecurity. Migrants coming to the cities do not all share the same food 
security baseline and this, in turn, impacts on their perceptions of food 
security in the city.
The 2008 AFSUN urban food security baseline survey provides an 
opportunity for a much broader regional comparison of migrant and non-
migrant households in the poorer neighbourhoods of cities. Given the 
centrality of food purchase to urban food security, access to income is 
a critical issue. The question, then, is whether established non-migrant 
households are more or less likely to access regular and reliable sources of 
income, both formal and informal. In general, the income source profile 
for migrant and non-migrant households is not that dissimilar (Table 10). 
Across the sample as a whole, unemployment rates are high with nearly 
half of both migrant and non-migrant households receiving no income 
from regular wage work. This suggests that migrants are no more or less 
likely to obtain wage employment than permanent residents in the city, a 
finding of some significance since it is often assumed that migrants have a 
harder time finding work than those born and bred in a city. 
Migrant households do seem to find it easier to derive income from casual 
work (Table 10, Figure 7). A number of other small differences emerged. 
First, non-migrant households were more involved than migrant house-
holds in running informal and formal businesses (20% versus 14%). This 
suggests it may be easier for permanent residents of the city to access the 
resources (such as credit) to run and grow a business. Secondly, although 
very few households in either category earn any income from the sale of 
home-grown agricultural produce, non-migrant households did seem a 
little more likely to engage in urban agriculture, presumably because they 
have readier access to land through home ownership. Thirdly, migrant 
households were slightly more likely than non-migrant households to be 
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receiving social grant income (19% versus 16%). The difference is not 
large but it suggests that migrant households eligible to receive social 
grants are able to access them even if they are not in their home area.
TABLE 10: Sources of Household Income
Migrant Households (%) Non-Migrant Households 
(%)
Wage Work 51.2 54.4
Casual Work 24.2 20.1
Remittances 8.0 8.4
Urban Agriculture Products 1.0 3.2
Formal Business 3.5 4.1
Informal Business 10.5 15.9
Rent 4.0 5.5
Social Grants 19.3 15.6
N 2,425 801
FIGURE 7: Sources of Household Income
The similarities in the access of migrant and non-migrant households to 
the labour market and to various income-generating activities suggests 
that they might have similar income levels and, in turn, levels of food 
security. In fact, there was one distinct difference in the income profile 
of migrant and non-migrant households (Figure 8). About a third of the 
households in each group fell into the lowest income tercile. However, 
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36% of non-migrant households were in the upper income tercile, 
compared to only 29% of migrant households. The situation was reversed 
with the middle income tercile. In other words, migrant status is not a 
completely reliable predictor of whether a household will be income poor. 
However, non-migrant households are likely to have a better chance of 
having better incomes, primarily because some are able to access better-
paying jobs. 
FIGURE 8: Income Terciles
Since urban households purchase the bulk of their food, non-migrant 
households might have a better chance of being food secure than migrant 
households. The Household Food Insecurity Scale (HFIAS) measures 
access to food on a 0 (most secure) to 27 (most insecure) point scale. The 
mean and median score for all households in the survey was 10, suggesting 
widespread food insecurity. Individual city means varied from a low of 5 
in Johannesburg to a high of 15 in Harare.65 In terms of the relationship 
between the HFIAS and food security, migrant households had a mean 
score of 10.5 and a median of 10. Non-migrant households had lower 
scores of 8.9 and 8 respectively. Although the differences are not massive, 
the results confirm that non-migrant households have a better chance of 
being food secure than migrant households. 
This finding is given added weight by the Household Food Insecurity 
Access Prevalence (HFIAP) Indicator. Only 16% of migrant households 
can be categorized as “food secure” using the HFIAP Indicator, compared 
with 26% of non-migrant households (Figure 9). At the opposite end 
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of the scale, 61% of migrant households were severely food insecure, 
compared with only 48% of non-migrant households. Or again, 78% 
of migrant households are either moderately or severely food insecure, 
compared with 65% of non-migrant households. Although levels of food 
insecurity are disturbingly high for both types of household, migrant 
households stand a greater chance of being food insecure.
FIGURE 9: Food Security of Migrant and Non-Migrant Households
Another dimension of food insecurity is dietary diversity. The House-
hold Dietary Diversity Scale (HDDS) measures how many food groups 
have been eaten by household members in the previous 24 hours (up to a 
maximum of 12). Most poor migrant and non-migrant households do not 
have a particularly diverse diet. For example, nearly half of both groups 
consumed food from 5 or fewer food groups, and nearly a quarter from 3 
or fewer food groups. The main difference between the two groups comes 
at the other end of the scale where diverse diets are more frequent among 
non-migrant than migrant households. For example, 28% of migrant 
households consumed food from 7 or more food groups, compared with 
38% of all non-migrant households. In other words, non-migrant house-
holds are generally likely to have a more diverse diet.
Another question is whether there are any differences between migrant 
and non-migrant households in where they obtain their food in the city. 
Here some interesting differences emerged. Migrant households were 
more likely than non-migrant households to patronise supermarkets. 
The opposite was true with regard to the informal food economy. The 
reason for this difference is not immediately apparent but may have to do 
with the fact that non-migrant households would be more familiar with 
alternative food sources compared with recent in-migrants, in particular, 
who would be more likely to know about and recognise supermarket 
outlets. A second difference is the extent to which households rely on 
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other households for food, either through sharing meals or food transfers. 
This was more common among migrant than non-migrant households, 
suggesting the existence of stronger social networks amongst migrants. 
Thirdly, and unsurprisingly given their greater degree of access to land 
for gardens, non-migrant households were more likely to grown some of 
their own food than migrant households.
TABLE 11: Household Dietary Diversity
No. of Food 
Groups
Migrant Households (cum %) Non-Migrant Households (cum %)
1 3 4
2 14 14
3 24 23
4 34 33
5 47 45
6 59 56
7 71 66
8 83 78
9 91 86
10 95 91
11 97 95
12 100 100
FIGURE 10: Sources of Food for Migrant and Non-Migrant Households
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5. MIGRATION AND FOOD  
 TRANSFERS
The rural and urban nodes in stretched households are linked by flows of 
people, cash, goods and information. There is evidence that urban house-
holds in Africa rely to varying degrees on an informal, non-marketed 
supply of food from their rural (and urban) relatives in order to survive 
within hostile urban environments.66 In one documented case, Wind-
hoek, the contribution turned out to be extremely significant.67 Frayne’s 
study of 305 poor urban households found that poverty was widespread 
and accompanied by high rates of unemployment. In addition, casual 
work was not commonly available for low-income residents. The informal 
sector was much more limited than in other cities in the region and urban 
agriculture was scant and provided little contribution to household food 
security. Only 5% of the sample were involved in some form of urban 
agriculture. Yet there was no widespread starvation and little malnutri-
tion. Only 9% of households said that hunger was always or almost always 
a problem.
The primary asset that ameliorated the food insecurity of urban house-
holds proved to be urban-rural social networks. The resources required 
to satisfy food and other needs come predominantly from the rural areas 
direct to the urban household. The most vulnerable households were 
those that had poor rural connections. However, 98% of the households 
had relatives in the rural areas. Two-thirds of the households received 
food from relatives and friends in the year prior to the survey. Nearly 60% 
received food 2-6 times a year. Another study of Windhoek in 2008 found 
that 44% of households interviewed in the poorer parts of the city received 
food from outside the city and that 99% of this food was sent by family 
members. Furthermore, 73% of this food was sent from the Northern 
regions. The food received by the urban household included millet, wild 
foods (especially spinach), meat, poultry and fish. The vast majority of 
households (90%) consumed the food themselves with only 6% selling 
it and 4% giving it away to other relatives and friends. In Windhoek, 
therefore, urban food security for economically marginal households was 
dependent “to a large degree” on the transfer of food from rural relatives:
 The flow of goods between the urban and rural areas is truly recip-
rocal. With about two thirds of urban households both sending 
money to the rural areas and receiving food from rural households, 
the rural-urban symbiosis is well-established. Unless there is rapid 
economic growth with jobs for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in 
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Windhoek, the flow of food into the urban areas is likely to continue 
as urban households continue to diversify their sources of food and 
income.68
In the case of Maputo, the urban poor maintain “a close and conscious 
relationship” with their rural area of origin:
 They argue that it is important to maintain relationships with rela-
tives and others in the village, and that being involved in agriculture 
is important as “we do not have to spend so much money on food.” 
Having machambas in the village is considered the best option as this 
attaches people to their extended family, but many also have small 
plots on the outskirts of Maputo or in the bairro itself.69
In Harare, too, migrants to the city maintain strong social and material 
connections with the rural areas. In the past, the established practice was 
for urban households to send money and supplementary food to the rural 
areas. However, economic hardships in the city are now making it diffi-
cult for these flows to continue.70 Many urban households maintain small 
plots of land in the village where they grow crops or keep animals. The 
importance of these activities has grown with the food crisis in the cities. 
By engaging in rural farming, urban household members contribute to 
generating the food that they eat when they visit the countryside or sell to 
get a supplementary income that they can use in both the rural and urban 
area. A 2008 survey in Harare found that 35% of respondents normally 
visit the rural areas to engage in farming activity.71 As many as 64% of 
household respondents also reported that they normally visit their rural 
homes to collect food and/or money. The economic crisis in that country 
has, however, reconfigured the nature of these relationships and flows. 
Urban households are increasingly getting more from the village than 
they send, suggesting that the flow of resources between the rural and the 
urban area has reversed. The net urban-ward flow of resources, and espe-
cially food, is partly responsible for the resilience of poor households in 
the city. More than half of the households surveyed (61%) received food 
from the rural areas. The most common foods transferred from the rural 
areas included cereals (54% of households), root and tubers (36%), meat 
and poultry (26%) and food made from beans and nuts (16%) (Figure 11). 
The high cost of transport between the rural and the urban areas meant 
that the majority of food transfers were only taking place 3-6 times a year 
or even less frequently. Another crisis-related response involved members 
of the urban household migrating back to the rural areas of Zimbabwe.
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FIGURE 11: Type and Frequency of Rural-Urban Food Transfers to Harare
 
Source: Tawodzera, 2010.
The prevalence of rural-urban food linkages in other parts of the Southern 
African region needs more systematic investigation.72 With this in mind, 
the 2008-9 AFSUN baseline survey included a number of questions 
about food transfers in the 11 cities in which the survey was conducted.73 
Almost one in three of the poor urban households surveyed by AFSUN 
said they receive food from relatives or friends outside the city. The food 
flows from relatives make up over 90% of the total. The study confirmed 
the significance of food transfers in Windhoek with 47% of households 
receiving food from outside the city. Transfers were also very significant 
in Lusaka (44%), Harare (42%), Maseru (37%), Blantyre (36%) and 
Manzini (35%) (Figure 12). By contrast, and not unexpectedly given the 
impoverished state of South Africa’s communal land areas, the propor-
tion of urban households receiving food transfers was much lower in the 
three South African cities surveyed. While food transfers from rural areas 
were certainly significant (41% of all households receiving transfers), 
the survey made the important finding that even more transfers (48%) 
occurred between households in different urban areas. The remainder 
received food from both rural and other urban areas. Once again, clear 
differences emerged between different cities. Households in Windhoek 
and Gaborone were at one end of the spectrum, with around 70% of 
transfers emanating from rural areas.
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FIGURE 12: Total Food Transfers to Urban Households (% of Households)
 
The relative importance of rural-urban versus urban-urban food transfers 
varied considerably from city to city. Rural transfers to households in 
Windhoek made up 72% of total transfers while urban-urban transfers 
made up only 12%. At the other end of the spectrum were the South 
African cities. Cape Town, for example, had figures of 14% for rural-
urban and 83% for urban-urban transfers. Some 82% of transfers to 
Msunduzi and 62% of transfers to Johannesburg were also from other 
urban areas outside these cities. The South African pattern reflects several 
things. First, South Africa is the most urbanized of the nine countries in 
the study. Secondly, South Africa’s rural areas are so impoverished that 
they do not produce excess food that can be sent to support migrants 
in the city. And thirdly, social networks and ties between relatives in 
different cities are strong. 
The figures for the cities in major migrant-sending countries are also 
significant. In Maputo, for example, 62% of transfers are urban-urban. 
High rates of urban-urban food transfer can also be found in Blantyre 
(51%), Maseru (44%), Lusaka (44%) and Harare (43%). In each case, it is 
likely that a large proportion of transfers come in the form of food remit-
tances where migrants working in one city (often in another country) 
send food to their relatives living in another urban area (often in their 
home country).
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The type of transfer, whether rural or urban, was related to the frequency 
with which urban households receive food. Households receive food 
transfers far more often when the food comes from an urban area. Around 
a quarter of households who had received food from other urban areas 
did so at least once a week (compared to only 5% of households who 
received rural-urban transfers). Some 76% of households received urban-
urban transfers at least once every 2 months, compared to only 40% 
of households receiving rural-urban transfers (Figure 13). This might 
suggest that urban-urban networks and support mechanisms are stronger 
than rural-urban ties. Alternatively, transportation is undoubtedly easier 
between urban areas and urban-urban transfers are also much less likely to 
be affected by the seasonal agricultural cycle.
FIGURE 13: Frequency of Food Transfers to Urban Households by Area of 
Origin (% of Households)
TABLE 12: Food Transfers by City (% of Households)
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Transfers from rural and other urban areas are both dominated by cereals. 
All urban households in the study cities received cereals at some point 
during the year, irrespective of the source. However, there was a marked 
difference in the frequency of transfers with a quarter of urban-sourced 
cereals arriving at least once a week and 80% arriving at least once every 
couple of months or more frequently (Table 13). In contrast, cereals from 
rural areas came far less frequently, a clear reflection of the rural agricul-
tural cycle. Those receiving cereals from other urban areas are not depen-
dent on the cycle since the cereals can be purchased and sent at any time 
of the year. 
TABLE 13: Frequency of Transfers by Area of Origin (% of Households in 
Previous 12 Months)
Food Type Frequency Urban (%) Rural (%)
Cereals At least once a week 27 2
At least once every 2 months 52 25
3-6 times a year 12 36
At least once a year 9 37
Total 100 100
Other differences between rural and urban transfers also emerged. House-
holds receiving urban transfers were more likely to receive almost all types 
of foodstuffs (with the exception of foods made from beans, peas, lentils 
or nuts). For example, 51% of households receiving urban-urban transfers 
received vegetables compared with 35% of those receiving rural-urban 
transfers. Or again, 39% of urban-urban transfer households received meat 
or poultry compared with only 23% of rural-urban transfer households. 
The differences were particularly marked when it comes to processed 
foods such as sugar/honey (40% versus 5%) and foods made with oil, fat or 
butter (33% versus 6%).
Food transfers are particularly important for food-insecure urban house-
holds. Of the 1,809 households receiving food transfers from outside the 
city, 84% were food insecure and 16% were food secure. The relative 
importance of food transfers for food insecure households holds whether 
the food is received from rural areas or other urban areas. There were, 
however, variations between cities. In Gaborone, for example, households 
were more likely to be food-secure if they receive food from rural sources 
(33%), compared to either urban only (7%) or combined urban and rural 
sources (8%). In Maputo, on the other hand, only 1% of food-secure 
households received food from rural areas only, with 17% of food-secure 
households getting food from urban areas only (mostly from migrants 
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in South African cities) and the rest from both sources. Around 80% of 
households receiving food transfers said that they were important or very 
important to the household while 9% said they were critical to household 
survival.74 Almost the same number (77%) said that the food was sent to 
help the urban household feed itself. Only 20% said the food was sent as 
a gift. The centrality of food transfers to urban food consumption was 
illustrated by the fact that only 3% of households receiving food sold it for 
cash income. The rest consumed the food themselves.75
TABLE 14: Types of Food Transferred
Rural-Urban % of 
Receiving Households
Urban-Urban % of 
Receiving Households
Cereals/grain 100 100
Roots/tubers 21 35
Vegetables 37 51
Fruit 9 19
Meat/poultry 23 39
Eggs 4 14
Food from beans, peas, lentils, nuts 40 30
Cheese/milk products 10 18
Foods made with oil, fat, butter 6 33
Sugar/honey 5 40
N 753 890
As noted above, food transfers from households outside the city to house-
holds within it are a notable feature in a number of SADC cities. The 
final question which the AFSUN data sheds light on is whether migrant 
households are more or less likely to receive transfers than non-migrant 
households. Frayne has argued that migrants in the city receive such 
transfers to keep them going while they search for work or other sources 
of income. This suggests that migrant households, with their stronger 
rural ties, would be more likely to receive food from rural households. 
And so it proved although the difference was not that large. A total of 
15% of migrant households received food transfers from rural relatives, 
compared with only 10% of non-migrant households. Some non-migrant 
households clearly maintain links with rural areas of sufficient strength to 
facilitate food transfers. On the other hand, non-migrant households were 
more likely than migrant households to received food transfers from other 
urban areas (14% versus 10%). In addition, 61% of those non-migrant 
households receiving food transfers got them from relatives in other urban 
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areas (compared with only 28% who got them from rural areas). Migrant 
households were also more likely to receive urban than rural transfers 
although the difference was not as great (46% versus 43% of the total).
TABLE 15: Types of Transfer as Household Migrant-Status
Migrant Households (%) Non-Migrant Households 
(%)
Rural-Urban Food Transfers 43 28
Urban-Urban Food Transfers 46 61
Rural and Urban Transfers 11 11
6. CONCLUSION
Migration within and to the Southern African region has changed 
dramatically in recent decades. All of the evidence suggests that the 
region is undergoing a rapid urban transition through internal migration 
and natural population increase. There has also been significant growth 
in temporary cross-border movement within the region. The implica-
tions of the region’s new mobility regime for food security in general 
(and urban food security in particular) need much further exploration 
and analysis. To what degree is heightened mobility related to problems 
of food insecurity? Food security shocks and chronic food insecurity can 
certainly be major motives for migration for income-generating oppor-
tunities. War and conflict, particularly in Angola and the DRC, led to 
the displacement of millions who fled to neighbouring countries. The 
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy since 2000 has pushed hundreds 
of thousands of desperate food-insecure people out of the country. The 
meltdown has affected the poor but has also ravaged the urban middle-
class leaving migration as the main “exit option.” Chronic poverty and 
related food insecurity is also partially responsible for the upsurge in post-
1990 migration from countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi 
and Swaziland. 
Current conceptualisations of the food security crisis in Africa provide 
an inadequate basis for working at the interface between migration and 
food security. First, there is the pervasive assumption that food security is 
primarily a rural problem that will be resolved through technical innova-
tion amongst smallholders (in the guise of a new Green Revolution). What 
seems to be forgotten in this essentially romantic view of the African rural 
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household is that its food security is not simply, or even mainly, a function 
of what it does or does not grow for itself. Up and down the continent 
rural households purchase some or most of their food and they do so with 
cash that they receive from household members who have migrated to 
earn income in other places within the country and across borders. The 
evidence for Southern Africa, at least, is that these rural households do not 
invest remittances in agriculture but in basic necessities, including food 
purchase.76 Rural food security, in other words, may be improved but 
will not be resolved by current productionist approaches to food security.
A second flawed assumption is that food security in urban areas is about 
promoting urban agriculture. Urban agriculture can certainly contribute 
to the food security of some households but it is very far from being a 
panacea for all.77 The obsession with urban agriculture may be well-
intentioned but it derives from the misplaced idea that increased food 
production is the key to urban food security. The primary determinant 
of food insecurity in African cities is not production shortfalls but the 
lack of access to food and that means the absence of a regular and reliable 
income with which to purchase it. Even within the poorest areas of the 
city, access varies considerably from household to household with wage 
employment, other income-generating activity, the size and structure of 
the household, the educational level of the household members, access 
to social grants and being embedded in social networks. This paper has 
also demonstrated that the migrant status of a household is a key determi-
nant of food security. The differences between migrant and non-migrant 
households are relatively significant. While there are many poor and food 
insecure households in both camps, there are more food secure house-
holds in the non-migrant group. 
A third problematic assumption is that the rural and urban are separate 
spheres with a deep divide between them. This dualistic view of the world 
is clearly at odds with the observable web of connections and flows that 
bind rural and urban spaces together. The concept of the stretched or 
multi-nodal household attempts to capture the reality that even at the 
micro-scale, there is regular circulation of people, goods and money 
between town and countryside. Conceptually and methodologically, 
this reality means that it is impossible to fully explain the state of food 
security of urban households without reference to their rural counter-
parts, and vice-versa. For example, one of the reasons why there are fewer 
food secure migrant households in the cities may be because, unlike 
non-migrant households, they remit a portion of their income to rural 
areas which are in even greater need of the cash. On the other hand, the 
situation of migrant households would be even more desperate but for 
relatively widespread intra-household rural-urban transfers of food.
urban food security series no. 9  39
The fourth assumption is that migration and mobility are of limited rele-
vance to food security. There are some recent signs of recognition of the 
reality that migration and remittances play an important role in the food 
security strategies of rural households. What tends to be overlooked is the 
role of migration in the food security of urban households. As this paper 
shows, the majority of households in poor areas in Southern African cities 
either consist entirely of migrants or a mix of migrants and non-migrants. 
Rapid urbanization, increased circulation and growing cross-border 
migration have all meant that the number of migrants and migrant house-
holds in the city has grown exponentially. This is likely to continue for 
several more decades as urbanization continues. We cannot simply assume 
that all poor urban households are alike. While levels of food insecurity 
are unacceptably high amongst all of them, migrant households do have a 
greater chance of being food insecure with all of its attendant health and 
nutritional problems. This fact needs to be recognised by policy-makers 
and acted upon. 
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Over the last decade, two issues have risen to the top of the international 
development agenda: Food Security & Migration and Development. Each has 
its own agency champions, international gatherings, national line ministries 
and voluminous bodies of research. There is thus a massive institutional and 
substantive disconnect between these two development agendas. The reasons 
are hard to understand since the connections between migration and food 
security seem so obvious. Food security needs to be “mainstreamed” into the 
migration and development agenda and migration needs to be “mainstreamed” 
into the food security agenda. Without this happening, both agendas will 
proceed in ignorance of the other to the detriment of both. The result will be a 
singular failure to understand, and manage, the crucial reciprocal relationship 
between migration and food security.  This paper aims to promote a conversation 
between food security and migration experts and policy-makers with particular 
reference to the crisis of urban food security in Africa. The empirical basis of 
the conversation is an AFSUN survey in 2008 and its !ndings on the differences 
between migrant and non-migrant households in 11 cities in Southern Africa.
www.queensu.ca/samp
